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Abstract 
In a recent article in the Journal of Environmental Psychology, Zaal et al. [1] presented the results of three 
experimental studies conducted to systematically examine the effectiveness of the offering of monetary 
compensation (i.e., the offering of cash to a local community) in the context of the siting of hazardous facilities. The 
current conference paper highlights the main results of this research and discusses the relevance of these findings for 
the specific context of CCS.  
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1. Introduction 
Onshore carbon capture and storage (CCS) projects can encounter local opposition and may be perceived as being 
hazardous, as we have seen in the Dutch Barendrecht case [2]. The siting of locally unwanted facilities is often 
characterized by a situation in which local residents perceive that the risks and costs of (CCS) facilities are local, 
whereas the benefits of the projects are perceived to be at the regional or (inter)national level. The offering of 
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compensation to local communities may help to restore this imbalance and in this way it may help to prevent and/or 
solve (CCS) siting controversies [3].The type of compensation offered to communities may take different forms. 
Here we focus on a specific form of monetary compensation (i.e., the offering of cash to a local community). 
Previous research in the context of several (non CCS) facilities has shown that the offering of monetary 
compensation may backfire, in particular when people perceive that sacred values such as public health and safety 
are at risk [4, 5]. As such, for facilities that are perceived to be hazardous, the offering of monetary compensation 
tends to be rather ineffective, a finding that is potentially relevant for onshore CCS projects [3]. In a recent article in 
the Journal of Environmental Psychology, we presented the results of three experimental studies conducted to 
systematically examine why and when the offering of monetary compensation in the context of the siting of 
hazardous facilities is rather ineffective [1]. This research sheds light on factors that do (and do not) play a role in 
people’s support for the decision to accept a hazardous facility in a community and also provide building blocks for 
designing (more) effective monetary compensation. The current conference paper highlights the main results of this 
research (details can be found in [1]) and discusses the relevance of these findings for the specific context of CCS.  
2. Results 
In our paper we predicted and found that a problem with the offering of ‘plain’ money in return for the siting of a 
hazardous facility is that such a trade-off between what people consider a secular value (money) and a sacred value 
(health, safety) is considered taboo. This renders ‘plain’ monetary compensation in return for the siting of facilities 
that are perceived to be risky rather ineffective. Importantly, we also found that by rhetorically redefining the 
monetary compensation offer as having sacred (moral) value rather than secular (non-moral) value, the monetary 
compensation offer resulted in more support of the decision to site a hazardous facility in a community compared to 
the (identical) ‘plain’ monetary compensation offer. That is, merely mentioning that the monetary compensation 
offered may be used to increase local safety (e.g., by using the money to install a traffic light in the community, 
which would enhance local safety) significantly increased the perceived commensurability of the risk of the facility 
and the compensation offer and decreased negative emotions experienced. As a result, support for the decision to 
site the facility increased significantly. This increase in acceptance of the facility was found to be robust among 
studies and was not affected by factors such as the height of the compensation offer [1].  
3. Implications 
These findings have relevant implications for compensation in the context of CCS facility siting. That is, the results 
show the importance of knowing and investigating the local values that members of the local public believe are at 
stake before deciding on compensation (see [1]). When the local community’s concerns regarding a local CCS 
project mainly are financial in nature (i.e., involve secular values) the offering of plain monetary compensation can 
be rather effective. However, when people suspect that CCS activities form a threat to human health and safety (i.e., 
a threat to a sacred value), project developers should not necessarily shy away from offering monetary 
compensation, but in this case should think of whether monetary compensation is the right type of compensation to 
offer, and think of ways to present and frame the compensation offer to the public. Rhetorically redefining the 
monetary compensation offered may help to achieve a better fit between the compensation offer and the perceived 
risk of the facility. Fit alone is not sufficient, however. Several project preconditions need to be in place (e.g., the 
perceived legitimacy of and societal need for a local CCS project) and there are also ethical considerations that need 
to be taken into consideration, as discussed in our paper (see [1]). We concluded that the offering of monetary 
compensation can be useful to prevent or solve controversies regarding the siting of hazardous (CCS) facilities as 
long as it is ‘rhetorically redefined’ as having sacred (moral) rather than secular (non-moral) value.  
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